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Abstract: Since 2012, when broadcasting licenses were granted to various private 
television and radio stations in Mauritania, the controversy around the Battle of Um 
Tounsi (and Mauritania’s colonial past more generally) has grown substantially. 
One of the results of this unprecedented level of media freedom has been the prop-
agation of views defending the Mauritanian resistance (muqawama in Arabic) to 
French colonization. On the one hand, verbal and written accounts have emerged 
which paint certain groups and actors as French colonial power sympathizers. At the 
same time, various online publications have responded by seriously questioning the 
very existence of a structured resistance to colonization. This article, drawing pre-
dominantly on local sources, highlights the importance of this controversy in study-
ing the western Saharan region social model and its contemporary uses.
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Introduction
On March 13, 1995, a commemorative plaque displayed on a monument 
located eighty kilometers north of Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania, 
was destroyed, and the names inscribed on it were erased. This plaque had 
been placed there by the colonial administration in memory of those who 
had lost their lives in the Battle of Um Tounsi in 1932, in which colonial 
troops (with the support of local military personnel) clashed with fighters 
from the northern boundaries of present-day Mauritania. The instigators of 
this destruction were the descendants of some of those who died at Um 
Tounsi, who claim that their intention was to erase the traces of a shameful 
past, as the plaque served as a reminder that their ancestors fought alongside 
colonial forces (see Figure 1). This incident epitomizes the ambiguity of feel-
ings still evident today toward Mauritania’s colonial legacy. It also illustrates the 
Résumé: Depuis 2012, année où les licences de radiodiffusion ont été accordées à 
diverses stations de télévision et de radio privées en Mauritanie, la controverse 
autour de la bataille d’Um Tounsi et du passé colonial de la Mauritanie, plus 
généralement, s’est considérablement accrue. Un des résultats de ce niveau sans 
précédent de liberté médiatique a été la propagation de vues défendant la résistance 
mauritanienne (muqawama en arabe) à la colonisation française. D’une part, des 
récits verbaux et écrits ont apparus dépeignant certains groupes et acteurs comme des 
sympathisants du pouvoir colonial français. Parallèlement, diverses publications en 
ligne ont réagi en remettant sérieusement en cause l’existence même d’une résistance 
structurée à la colonisation. Cet article, qui s’appuie principalement sur des sources 
locales, souligne l’importance de cette controverse dans l’étude du modèle social 
ouest saharien et de ses utilisations contemporaines.
Resumo: Desde 2012, quando foram concedidas licenças de transmissão a várias 
estações privadas de televisão e de rádio na Mauritânia, a controvérsia em torno da 
Batalha de Um Tounsi (e, mais genericamente, em torno do passado colonial da 
Mauritânia) tem sofrido desenvolvimentos substanciais. Uma das consequências 
deste nível sem precedentes de liberdade de imprensa foi a disseminação de pontos 
de vista enaltecedores da resistência mauritana (em árabe, muqawama) contra a 
colonização francesa. Em contrapartida, surgiram testemunhos escritos e orais que 
retratam determinados grupos e atores como sendo simpatizantes das forças coloni-
ais francesas. Em simultâneo, várias publicações online têm reagido, questionando 
seriamente a simples existência de uma resistência organizada contra a colonização. 
Partindo de fontes predominantemente locais, o presente artigo sublinha a 
importância desta controvérsia para o estudo do modelo social oeste saariano, bem 
como dos seus usos contemporâneos.
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intricacy and pervasive character of this historical period, a century after the 
implementation of colonial rule and more than half a century after the 
country’s independence in 1960, as the descendants of the Mauritanian 
participants of that colonial battle reenact this clash in the national parlia-
ment and in different media outlets.1
The media freedom unleashed after the end of the long rule of 
President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya (1984–2005) reached its apex in 
January 2012, when broadcasting licenses were granted to various private 
television and radio stations.2 Since then, the controversy surrounding the 
Battle of Um Tounsi (and Mauritania’s colonial past more generally) has 
intensified substantially. One of the results of this unprecedented media 
freedom has been the propagation of views defending the—seemingly 
forgotten—Mauritanian resistance (muqawama in Arabic) to French coloni-
zation.3 Through often-virulent verbal attacks, various people have been 
accused of having “collaborated” with the colonial authorities. Further 
exacerbating this tension, many television and radio stations have felt com-
pelled to give air time to commentators who, in the most bitter terms, 
openly accused a specific region of the country and/or a particular commu-
nity (e.g., the Trarza/El Gibla region of southwestern Mauritania and its 
“religious”/Zwāya status groups; see Figure 3) of being traitors and “lackeys” 
of France. This verbal aggression caused a chain reaction, giving rise to what 
we term a “negationist” discourse, meaning the attempt of anti-resistance 
Figure 1. Um Tounsi’s colonial monument 80 kilometers north of 
Nouakchott (Photo by Elemine Ould Mohamed Baba)
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voices to question the commonly accepted facts and the quasi-hegemonic 
nature of the current “resistance narrative.” Using similar media platforms 
(i.e., newspaper columns, social media, and web pages), voices rejecting the 
very existence of resistance to colonization started to emerge. This debate 
is not new in Mauritania, but the public dimension it has recently attained 
has transformed it into a de facto national debate.4
The actors and the motives behind this current public outburst elude a 
precise definition. One can confidently discern, however, a state-sponsored 
effort to inscribe the resistance narrative in media and political agendas. 
The outgoing president of Mauritania, Ould Abdel Aziz, personally deliv-
ered speeches addressing this topic. Furthermore, the majority of those 
defending the muqawama as a decisive moment in the country’s history can 
be traced back to the government and its supporters. Conversely, a large 
number of voices denying the existence of an effective resistance move-
ment in colonial Mauritania belong to the political opposition to the cur-
rent presidency of Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, who assumed office in 
August 2019 and who continues the agenda of Ould Abdel Aziz.
Further complicating this controversy, this debate also engages with 
the widely known western Saharan tripartite social design (Stewart 1973). 
Remarkably, those supporting the resistance debate are predominantly 
from the northern and eastern regions of Mauritania and bear an Hassān 
(“warrior”) social status, while those denying the significance of this debate 
belong mostly to Zwāya (“religious”) status groups hailing from southwest-
ern Mauritania. Without attempting to simplistically reduce this debate to a 
binary social partition, which has been abundantly questioned (Bonte 1989; 
Cleaveland 1998; Harrison 1988:38), the inescapable presence of the 
Hassān/Zwāya historical rivalry reflected in the contemporary “resistance 
debate” must nonetheless be acknowledged. As we will later demonstrate, 
while providing elements of comparison with neighboring countries 
and with parallel situations in Europe, the evocation of this debate 
remains eminently local in character and clearly tied to the historically 
deep-rooted Saharan social landscapes.5
To the best of our knowledge, the existing body of academic discussion 
on this topic—the rivalry between Hassān and Zwāya status groups— 
predominantly relies on historical documentation. We draw rather on other 
elements, analyzing, in particular, documents emanating from different 
media outlets such as newspapers, radio, TV shows, and social media. Our 
approach is important insofar as it incorporates a significant corpus of non-
referenced bibliographical materials, largely published online on Mauritanian 
media platforms or newspapers. This methodological option effectively 
broadens the scope of available sources on contemporary Mauritanian 
debates and authors. It should also classify and validate such sources as signif-
icant elements in the understanding of regional history. Our selection incor-
porates the authors—often with a limited track record of published materials 
(books)—who, through their public voices (in Arabic and French), have 
more clearly delineated the muqawama controversy.
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The reading suggested here is less concerned with history-centered 
Saharan scholarly debates and more with the contemporary display and use of 
such argumentation, and in this respect it echoes some of the decolonizing 
knowledge debates gripping many parts of Africa and beyond. Public chal-
lenges to historical narratives, particularly the way that colonial legacies are 
remembered, memorialized, contested, and disrupted, inform our narration 
of the Mauritanian debates (e.g., Mamdani 2016; Mignolo 2011; Nyamnjoh 
2016). We claim, nonetheless, that Mauritanian particularities, especially the 
impact of the recent loosening of media controls, have greatly impacted the 
understanding of Mauritania’s distant as well as its more recent (colonial) 
past. This article begins with a theoretical introduction to the memory debate, 
particularly as it relates to Mauritanian so-called resistance; we then discuss 
key actors associated with the “resistance” on Mauritanian media platforms 
and analyze their main ideas. The article concludes with a focus on the polit-
ical instrumentalization that has taken place with regard to this controversy, 
particularly in light of recent decisions by the Mauritanian parliament.
History, memory, and politics
Debates about memory have been extensively explored by philosophers 
and historians (Bédarida 2001; Nora 1984; Ricœur 2000); these scholarly 
exercises provide us with a set of tools that allows us to address the 
Mauritanian resistance debate, as well as this country’s (late) discussion of 
its colonial past and of its present as an independent state.
Memory debates involve memorial places and chosen historical epi-
sodes. They generally embrace political motivations and tend to be instru-
mentalized. These memorialized topics then are publicly discussed through 
different media outlets as well as in academic publications. The creation 
of memories often pertains to issues of identity—concerning policies of 
national definition, or the interests of a specific group—through the selec-
tion of a particular episode that is either glorified or denigrated. The con-
struction of memories is often based on the idealized conception a group 
or a community has about its past, which can be either negative (victimiza-
tion) or positive (glorification). When making its claims, a community 
opens itself to be challenged by other groups with contradictory views 
regarding the episode at hand. These opinions tend to generate a conflict-
ing version of the same event, causing what Pascal Blanchard and Isabelle 
Veyrat-Masson (2008) have called “the war of memories.”
Generally speaking, the relationship between history and memory, 
though closely related, differs in nature, objectives, and means. Pierre Nora 
accurately defines memory as a domain that “filters, accumulates, capitalizes, 
and transmits,. . . erases and recomposes at will, according to the needs of the 
moment” (Blanchard & Veyrat-Masson 2008:337). The work of memory is 
thus resolutely subjective and partial, sometimes simply representing a 
manipulation of history (Klein 2000); it can also be oriented toward oblivion 
and the rejection of certain episodes. Through this selective work, a 
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community can either rewrite or conceal part of its history. The work of 
memory thus participates both in a “strategy of forgetfulness as well as remem-
brance” (Gensberger & Lavabre 2005:8). Enveloping the known parameters 
of “forgetfulness” or “reminiscence” (Étienne 2006), the state is many times 
a protagonist in the making of memories (or, in fact, history; see Trouillot 
[1995]). This stance, sometimes embodied in memorial laws, can aggravate 
an already strained landscape of conflicting opinions (see Figure 2).6
The fate of the Um Tounsi’s monument described above epitomizes 
the ambivalent approach of certain segments of society toward the remem-
bering of a particular event. Those who destroyed this memorial plaque 
wanted to forget an episode that was disadvantageous for them, while 
others, observing the same event, reiterated the implausibility of any resis-
tance movement against French colonial rule in Mauritania.7
Attempting a reading of the region’s colonial past, one cannot over-
look recent events in neighboring Senegal. In contrast to events in 
Mauritania—where the Um Tounsi’s memorial plaque has not been reha-
bilitated and the whole monument is today practically in ruins—in Senegal 
the statue of the former French governor of the colony, Louis Faidherbe, 
initially erected in 1886, was restored to public space in 2017, with the 
inscription: “To its governor, L. Faidherbe, Senegal is grateful.” In fact, 
the Senegalese government ordered the mayor of the city of Saint-Louis 
to repair Faidherbe’s statue after strong gusts of wind toppled it from its 
pedestal in September 2017. This episode has raised intense debate, with 
opinions in some cases declaring that this “was the perfect opportunity to 
get rid of it once and for all” and others arguing that Faidherbe was “the 
creator of modern Senegal and the liberator of black Senegalese facing 
the exactions of the Moors.”8
Figure 2. Avenue de la Résistance, Rachid, Mauritania (Photo by Elemine 
Ould Mohamed Baba)
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Achille Mbembe’s “conspiratorial reading of history” (2001:11), identi-
fying Africa’s need to annihilate its enemy (the colonizer) as a common 
model for producing cultural identity, is also useful here, particularly if we 
focus on the recent actions promoted by the Mauritanian government. 
While reflecting on Mbembe’s views, what is probably more surprising are 
the difficulties observed in the process of structuring national identity, 
almost sixty years after the closure of the colonial moment in Mauritania. If 
the memory/resistance debate in Mauritania in fact portrays the colonizer 
as an enemy—despite the depth of the social, political, and economic 
bonds still noticeable between Nouakchott and Paris—it equally resonates 
with more profound social questionings specific to Mauritanian hassano-
phone spheres.
The most prominent aspect of the resistance debate relates to the 
reawakening of the well-known rivalry between groups of different status 
(Hassān and Zwāya). The present reassessment of the country’s history af-
firms the resuscitation of a unresolved centuries-old quarrel, which was 
muted during the colonial and immediate postcolonial period. The diffi-
culties faced by Mauritania in its transition from colony to independent 
state—difficulties also evident in the theorizing efforts of researchers on 
postcolonial spheres (Seth 2014)—are proof of the ubiquitous character of 
these internal tensions. One wonders if Mauritania is not finally concluding 
its decolonial transition, through what Mudimbe (1994:xiv) called a return 
to the “original locality.” Our analysis has broader significance for current 
debates about the decolonization of knowledge, insofar as the data pre-
sented here declare a valuable reassessment of Mauritania’s colonial period 
(and, in fact, of the overall western region of the Sahara). The succession 
of long political administrations (Daddah, 1960–1978; Ould Taya, 1984–
2005), as well as the instability generated between these regime-change 
periods, seem to have somewhat frozen the public debate associated with 
the country’s colonial past. It might have taken Mauritania more than half 
a century to fully consider its internal tensions and, while coming to terms 
with its colonial past, reassess the social designs associated with its Bidhan 
populations.
Society and history in the muqawama debate
In order to fully understand the surge of publications denying the exis-
tence of a resistance movement to colonization in Mauritania, it is necessary 
to briefly recall the region’s underlying sociohistorical context. The popu-
lation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania comprises an Arab-Berber 
community known as Bidhan (Moors in English) and three Black African 
communities: Pulaar, Soninké, and Wolof. Traditionally, each of these 
communities hierarchically discriminates between “noble” groups—of 
“religious” and “warrior” status—served by different tributary populations 
(Barry 1985; Bathily 1989; Kane 1986). As the resistance debate dealt 
with in this article is limited to the Bidhan, we will restrict ourselves to 
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presenting the historical background of this community, which took its cur-
rent form in the seventeenth century, with the consolidation of the duality 
between the two components of its nobility: a “religious” group of Sanhadja 
origin (the Zwāya) and a group of warriors of Arab origin (the Hassān). 
The Arabs who began their descent into present-day Mauritania in the fif-
teenth century triumphed over the region’s original inhabitants and later 
founded supra-tribal political organizations called emirates, four of which 
reigned over the Moorish country: Trarza, Brakna, Tagant, Adrar.9
At the end of the nineteenth century, conflicts between different emir-
ates, and succession crises within one emirate, created an “anarchic” (sayba) 
milieu, marked by the increase of depredatory raids carried out by the 
tribes of the north (the Ahil Sahil, essentially comprising the Rgueybat, 
the Awlād Busba, and the Awlād Dlaym), which frequently targeted the 
southern (Al-Gibla) Zwāya tribes, who pejoratively called their rival groups 
lamhaliyyin (“the wicked”).10
It is during this period (the late nineteenth century) that the exist-
ing rivalries between nomadic groups (from the north) and southern 
Mauritanian populations (much more attached to commerce and with very 
Figure 3. Map representing the Bidhan geographic aire d’influence
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limited nomadic routes) started to experience the interference of European 
colonial powers throughout the extended western Saharan region. French 
authority, centralized in Saint-Louis (a town bordering Mauritania, on the 
southern margins of the Senegal River basin), hoped to consolidate its rule 
over the northern (eminently Saharan) territories. This ambition (Taylor 
1995) should be seen in the context of the southern Moroccan frontier, 
where the Spanish accelerated a colonial project of their own for the west-
ern Sahara. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in addi-
tion to intra-Saharan social rivalries (often comprising north-south 
depredatory raids), interventions by colonial actors throughout the entire 
Bidhan region of influence were increasingly significant.
The Zwāya, suffering from predatory raids from the north and often 
oppressed by warrior groups from their own emirate (Ould Mohamed 
Baba 1984:7), supported the machinations of Xavier Coppolani, a colo-
nial officer who, with the aid of distinguished Zwāya figures such as Cheikh 
Sidiya Baba, ratified the French protectorate over the Trarza (El Gibla) 
region (southwestern Mauritania) on December 12, 1902 (Harrison 
1988:33–40).11
From the Hassān standpoint, opposition to this agreement was imme-
diate. Ahmed Ould Deid, the Trarza emir, now a hero for the resistance 
party, decided to attack the French forces. The Brakna emir, Ahmedu Ould 
Sid’Eli, also participated in the 1906 battles against the French. Bakar Ould 
Swayd Ahmed, the emir of the Tagant, and Sid’Ahmed Ould Ahmed Ould 
‘Ayda, the Adrar emir, were both killed in combat (in 1905 and 1932 
respectively).
Coppolani was murdered in Tidjikja on May 12, 1905, by a commando 
unit led by Sharif Sidi Ould Moulay Zein.12 In the aftermath, armed groups 
from different regions, galvanized by the psychological effect of Coppolani’s 
death and with the support of the Moroccan sultan, created a federation 
under the banner of Cheikh Ma al-‘Ainin.13 The French forces subse-
quently suffered a number of crushing defeats, forcing them to deploy 
many more troops to maintain control of the Adrar region (northern 
Mauritania) in 1909 (Bonte 1984, 2006). By then, the northern tribes, often 
called tlāmīd (“disciples”) of Cheikh Ma al-‘Ainin, and commanded by Ma 
al-‘Ainin’s own sons, were raiding colonial military posts while also attack-
ing the populations of the Al-Gibla region, whom they accused of providing 
logistical support to colonial forces. The followers and sons of Cheikh Ma 
al-‘Ainin justified these actions by a fatwa, which declared that the goods 
owned by these populations constituted lawful booty.14 These guerrilla 
raids continued until 1934, when aviation and radio TSF started to operate 
in Mauritania.15 In the same year, a joint colonial operation, uniting troops 
from Sudan (colonial Mali), Algeria, and Morocco, regrouped around 
Mauritania’s northeastern borders. This blocked off the corridors from 
which the groups of fighters staged their attacks on French military posts. 
This is the historical context that led to the “war of memories” currently 
taking place in Mauritania.
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“You are nothing but looters”
Since at least November 28, 2008, the commemorations of Mauritania’s 
independence have been permanently marked by controversy. While 
declaring their right to freedom of expression, some speakers have started 
openly to attack Zwāya status groups (those from the Trarza/Al-Gibla 
region, in particular), who are regarded as the main endogenous vectors of 
colonial occupation and openly treated as “traitors to the national cause.” 
They have been accused of responsibility for facilitating colonization, “by 
offering them [the colonizers] legitimacy through treaties and fatwas and 
by providing them with supplies.”16 In contrast, according to this view, the 
Hassān established a coherent front blocking French occupation.
Faced with these attacks, the voices of those opposed to the existence of 
any resistance movement in Mauritania also gained an audience in the gen-
eral public, and over time the media began to give them a lot of publicity. 
An online article with the corrosive title “National Resistance: Myth or 
Reality?” was published in 2014. The author of this article described the 
muqawama as “a war of interests, of raids and counter-raids of looter gangs” 
(Ould Inalla 2014).
One of the authors spurring the greatest controversy was undoubtedly 
Omar Ould Beibacar.17 Ould Beibacar published a series of articles about 
the “resistance,” the first of which was in response to the decision to name 
Nouakchott’s new airport “Um Tounsi.”18 He called for this decision to be 
reversed, claiming it was intended only to “immortalize a battle in which 
several dozen Mauritanian soldiers from the Trarza Nomadic Group were 
massacred in an ambush by a ghazi of 120 foreign looters.”19 In his rendi-
tion, this battle was motivated “essentially by a vendetta against Trarza war-
riors.” He concluded by asking, “how can we honor foreigners who have 
distinguished themselves by the looting and the systematic slaughter of our 
fellow citizens?” (Ould Beibacar 2015a).
After this first article, Ould Beibacar became more and more virulent, 
and in his second article titled “Facing Colonial Occupation: Can We Speak 
of Resistance?” (Ould Beibacar 2015b), he explicitly attacked the iconic 
figure of the resistance narrative, Sharif Sidi Ould Moulay Zein (see foot-
note 12), who, on May 12, 1905, in Tidjikja in central Mauritania, killed 
Xavier Coppolani, the Governor-General’s delegate and architect of the 
so-called penetration pacifique (or peaceful expansion) in Mauritania.
Coppolani’s death constitutes a major turning point in Mauritanian 
colonial history. After his passing, colonial authorities experienced a period 
of uncertainty, and consideration was even given to withdrawing from 
Mauritania entirely. The disappearance of the head of the colonial expedi-
tion completely disorganized the “Tagant Mission,” which was besieged for 
a time after being apparently lost in enemy territory far from its bases. 
(Désiré-Vuillemin 1999:145–84). On the other hand, news of Coppolani’s 
death, while giving hope of a definitive end to the colonial expansion, pre-
sented additional arguments to the Saint-Louis trading lobby, which had 
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initially opposed Coppolani’s presence in Mauritania and pleaded for 
France to withdraw after this incident. For the Saint-Louis merchants, it 
would have been more profitable to continue trading peacefully with 
the Saharan populations rather than penetrating into their territory. 
Coppolani’s assassination also boosted the morale of the muqawama parti-
sans, who, by then, were benefiting from the military and organizational 
support of Cheikh Ma al-‘Aynin. This period, in fact, marked one of the 
greatest offensives of the resistance, notably with the battles of Tidjikja and 
N’yimlān in 1906 (Bonte 2002).
Let us now return to Ould Beibacar’s argument as outlined in his sec-
ond article (Ould Beibacar 2015b). He started by minimizing the effective 
role of the Sharif, suggesting that credit for the operation that made him 
famous should be shared with Sidi Ould Boubeit, a man the Sharif had met 
by chance and who nonetheless provided him with information on the pre-
cise location and routines of Coppolani and his entourage. According to 
Ould Beibacar, it was because of this man that the Sharif acquired the infor-
mation necessary for the success of the operation:
He had given him the precise situation with regard to the internal and 
external security features of the barracks, the enrolments, and the number 
of shifts during the day and night, the kind of armaments used, as well as 
the positioning of the units and the distribution of the missions. He had 
told him the most secure route to access the camp and set the perfect time 
and the most favorable place to make the assault, and finally the exact 
location of Coppolani. (Ould Beibacar 2015b)
In addition to noting the amateurish planning of this operation, 
dependent on the hazardous meeting of an anonymous informant, Ould 
Beibacar questions the authorship of the founding act of the so-called 
“Mauritanian resistance,” by asking “Who killed Coppolani?” He quotes 
Frèrejean, another decisive colonial actor, as saying that “it was a second 
shot fired by another member of the Sharif group that finished Coppolani 
off,” and concludes that “the Sharif was not the real killer” (Ould Beibacar 
2015b).20 This statement openly confronts a pivotal moment in the building 
of the resistance narrative. Sharif Sidi Ould Moulay Zein, the martyr par 
excellence, as well as his defining act of “bravery” are irreverently labeled “le 
coup de main de Tidjigja” by Ould Beibacar (2015b).
Ould Beibacar represents the core argument of those who refuse to 
qualify the armed actions undertaken against the French during the colo-
nial era as effective acts of resistance. For those who share this opinion, it is 
the culture of violence and the spirit of plunder that determined these 
actions, rather than any religious or patriotic motives, as supporters of the 
resistance narrative claim. According to his interpretation, the muqawama 
was nothing more than an armed “feudal” fight against French expansion, 
orchestrated by secular and bloodthirsty emirate leaderships that had 
profited from such methods since the eighteenth century. Some of the 
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members of this coalition were allied with ambitious militant Sufi brother-
hoods whose aim was essentially to preserve a long-established order (Ould 
Beibacar 2015b).
According to Ould Beibacar, the regional status quo was characterized 
by violence, arbitrariness, and the decline of Islamic values. He argued that 
the political structures behind these operations (the emirates) lived essen-
tially off the profits earned from the trade in gum arabic, salt, and especially 
slaves (captured among the black populations of the Senegal River basin), 
through a systematic plunder of the weakest. For him, the colonial occupa-
tion of Mauritania could not have favored the well-established “predation 
economy” on which certain segments of society based their supremacy. 
Therefore, in addition to denying the existence of real patriotic and reli-
gious motives, the deniers of the muqawama also act as the voice of the 
groups subjected to the oppression of the “old system,” and who were, nat-
urally, appreciative of the “benefits of colonization” (Ould Beibacar 2015b).
Ould Beibacar rejoices at the defeat of what he calls “feudal entities,” 
which were “fortunately beaten, pacified, and subjected to French coloniza-
tion, which was much more merciful.” In a highly provocative tone, he titles 
one of his texts “Merci Coppolani” (Ould Beibacar 2015c).21 He again 
heaps criticism on the hero of the resistance, Sharif Sidi Ould Moulay Zein, 
considering him “an enlightened fanatic” who committed a “heinous 
crime.” On the other hand, he laments the fate reserved for Coppolani: “an 
illustrious administrator, a great humanist of superior intelligence, who 
wanted to make our country the largest and richest of the states of French 
West Africa” (Ould Beibacar 2015c).
It is this opposition between the model established by the colonizer 
and a state of disruption (al-sayba, “the reign of anarchy”) that constitutes 
the backbone of the arguments of those refuting the muqawama, which is 
presented as an apologia for arbitrariness.
“You are nothing but ignorant”
The arguments advanced by Ould Beibacar have also been addressed by 
Ould Haroun, who, in a series of online articles, has distanced himself from 
the provocative style of Ould Beibacar.22 However, Ould Haroun’s argu-
ments can easily be qualified as a pro domo plea. Its author, a lawyer and 
counselor at the Ministry of Justice, is in fact the grandson of Cheikh Sidiya 
Baba, and his public intervention was based on what he considered “his 
family’s moral duty” to defend his ancestor (a renowned Islamic scholar 
and Brotherhood leader; see footnote 11).
In an introduction to the debate, Ould Haroun states that he hopes 
to respond, in particular, to the flow of denigrating arguments that 
became almost intolerable when “November zealots” and provokers, taking 
advantage of competition among television channels, began to label those 
who had cooperated with the colonizer as mercenaries, accomplices, 
lackeys, and traitors (Ould Haroun 2014).23 In his response to these 
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“provocations,” he extensively reviews local historiographic accounts and 
Islamic jurisprudence, to conclude that, due to the local and international 
geopolitical context, cooperation with the colonizer was the more justifi-
able option (Ould Haroun 2014).
He repeats Ould Beibacar’s argument, signaling the state of endemic 
anarchy that reigned in precolonial Mauritania, drawing on the existing 
sociocultural environment at the time of Cheikh Baba Ould Cheikh Sidiya. 
He defends his ancestor’s doctrinal position and reformist project, based 
on that of his grandfather, Cheikh Sidiya Ould Mokhtar al-Hayba (1777–
1868) (Robinson 2001:178–93).24
The elements of Islamic jurisprudence evoked by Ould Haroun remove 
all legitimacy from jihad/“resistance.” The basic conditions for jihad—the 
appointment of an imam and the establishment of communal funds—were 
simply not met in colonial Mauritania. For Ould Haroun, jihad is prescribed 
only when the hostility of the Christian party prevents Muslims from prac-
ticing their rite—something that, in his opinion, did not occur in colonial 
Mauritania (Ould Haroun 2014).
Ould Haroun also observed the geopolitical arguments explored in a 
fatwa by Cheikh Sidiya, where he argued for a peace pact with the French. 
His argumentation was based both on legal/theological justifications as 
well as on a pragmatic/political basis, as he viewed colonial progression as 
an unavoidable reality acknowledged all over the world. He thus concluded 
that it was better to negotiate peace with the French before being con-
fronted with their—inevitable—occupation of Mauritania (Ould Haroun 
2014).
The theological controversy, according to Ould Haroun, revolved 
around the writings of Islamic scholars who had allowed their followers to 
plunder the goods of the populations subjected to, or who were accom-
plices with, the French.25 On the basis of the evidence available to him, he 
demonstrates that these scholars finally distanced themselves from their 
initial position and prohibited any harm to the lives and property of the 
populations of southwestern Mauritania (Ould Haroun 2014).26 The 
absence of legal (Islamic) foundations for a resistance movement, the inev-
itability of colonization, and the anarchic antecedent acknowledged in the 
region supports the position of the muqawama deniers. These arguments 
should suffice to justify their cooperation with the colonial authority. The 
logical conclusion to this argument emphasizes the unfounded nature of 
the “resistance” and the pure and simple denial of the existence of such a 
movement.
Political uses of the muqawama
The Mauritanian government was itself directly involved in debates around 
the muqawama, and one might even speculate that it had a role in the cre-
ation of the controversy. Indeed, it was after a presidential speech, deliv-
ered in November 2009, during the official celebrations to mark the 
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country’s independence, that laudatory interventions regarding the resis-
tance started to permeate the media landscape. In his speech, President 
Aziz declared:
Our people have undeniably proved their commitment to these values 
through the enormous sacrifices they have made, with bravery and  
nobility, during the colonial period. Therefore, this anniversary is, for 
us, an opportunity to remember the martyrs of the motherland 
(Shuhada al-watan) in all pride and the heroes of the resistance that 
Allah has immortalized by His holy words.27
One might regard this moment as the start of the official rehabilitation 
of the resistance narrative in Mauritania, through a political effort expressed 
by the country’s highest figure. In celebrating the heroism of “the resis-
tance” and meditating on its martyrs, President Aziz committed the state to 
a policy that defends the need to rewrite the country’s recent history, thus 
questioning a historiographic tradition in which resistance to colonialism 
had, to a very large extent, been officially silenced.28
In stark contrast to the first generation of Mauritanian political leaders, 
President Aziz declared the emergence of a “New Mauritania,” which 
should distance itself from the “old regimes.” In his view, resistance should 
play a pivotal role in this agenda. Aziz’s role as champion of the resistance 
was made clear in yet another statement, made in November 2016, when 
he declared that “Mauritania has a rich history of fighting against colo-
nialism. . . . The nonwriting of the history of the national resistance is 
explained by external and internal causes, but it is necessary to write this 
history and to value it.”29 It is evident that the internal reasons he refers 
to are associated with the political class that governed the country until 
1978, which blatantly rejected the resistance topos. These political actors 
have been portrayed as direct heirs of the Gibla (southwestern Mauritania) 
politico-religious elite that established peace with the French colonial 
forces and continued to play a decisive role in the country’s transition to 
independence. For those in the resistance camp, the Gibla political actors 
have always aimed to silence anything likely to shame French colonization 
of Mauritania.
More recently, the resistance controversy has moved into Mauritania’s 
parliament, confirming its appropriation by eminently political groups. 
Following days of consultations, which were boycotted by some members of 
the opposition, revisions to the 1991 constitution were put to a referendum. 
The proposed amendments included changes to two key symbols associated 
with the first civil regime: the flag and the national anthem.30 Concerning 
the flag, it was proposed that two red stripes be added to the original design, 
symbolizing the blood of the martyrs of the resistance (see Figure 4).
As for the national anthem, the suggestion was made to introduce a 
completely new theme. For those proposing this amendment, the national 
anthem did not display any elements likely to stimulate patriotic fervor, 
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and, probably more importantly, it made no reference to the resistance. 
Those opposed to this proposal reiterated that the religious character of 
the hymn was the best conceivable formula for uniting the entire country 
around the song.31
The debate leading to the parliamentary approval of a new flag and a 
new national anthem perfectly illustrates the socio-political poles character-
izing the current resistance debate in Mauritania. For those unwilling to 
accept changes to these national symbols, Mauritania’s first civil regime rep-
resented a blessed time of affirmation of national identity, of civic values, 
and of economic development. For those defending the amendments, 
Aziz’s efforts were valued as patriotic acts, in line with the president’s coura-
geous reformist policies.
At times, this debate also assumed a regionalist angle, and was dragged 
into vulgarity and quibble in the antagonism between “the people of the 
north” and “the people of the south” (Ould Eida 2015). It was ultimately a 
controversy between the opposition, which sometimes used the arguments 
of the resistance deniers, and the supporters of President Aziz, who always 
supported the resistance and therefore supported the proposed reforms. 
The constitutional amendments finally adopted express the alignment 
between the government and those glorifying the resistance.32
These changes to the flag and the anthem, in addition to the renaming 
of Nouakchott Airport (now “Oumtounsy International Airport,” see 
Figure 5), can be likened to “memorial laws,” in that the state legislates on 
the basis of a non-consensual representation of the country’s past.33
Figure 4. The current Mauritanian flag now incorporates 2 red stripes, 
symbolizing the blood of the martyrs of the resistance
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Conclusion
The current memory debate in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is inex-
tricably linked to the country’s colonial past. But it also sheds light on the 
complexity of the region’s social design, associated in particular with its 
Bidhan populations. The government’s clear stance in this debate has 
helped to amplify the voices denying the existence of any structured resis-
tance to the French colonial powers, leading to a dangerous bipolarization 
between north and south in the country. From the political perspective, this 
“war of memories” represents a standoff between the old political regime 
and President Aziz’s project of a “new Mauritania.” The new generation of 
political actors brought about a different interpretation of the past, and the 
Mauritanian political elite of the 1960s and 1970s is heavily criticized for 
the role it played during the colonial period. Despite the strong presence 
of a political component, it would be a mistake to interpret this debate 
solely through a political lens. This debate also touches on the division 
between Zwāya and Hassān social status groups. The former were the main 
figures in the country’s political landscape during the transition period 
from independence to regime change in 1978, while the latter, favoring 
Hassān values, are currently finding themselves emboldened by former 
President Aziz’s policies and those of his designated successor.
Will the government persevere in its commitment to the “war of mem-
ories” by continuing to promulgate memorial laws? Will it recognize the 
rights of the resistance fighters and perhaps even support their reparation? 
And will it consider a gesture toward the frustrated Negro-African and 
Haratine communities, who claim recognition of past injustices? The 
rewriting of history that the Mauritanian government has more recently 
Figure 5. The new Nouakchott international airport, named after the battle 
of Um Tounsi (Photo by Elemine Ould Mohamed Baba)
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tried to accomplish would necessarily need to involve historians in the pro-
cess. The absence of any state initiative in this direction would validate gov-
ernment actors limiting themselves to a mere instrumentalization of 
memories. Contrary to the debate in France, where historians have 
voiced their disapproval of the state’s “abuse of memory” (Berliner 2005), 
Mauritanian historians have not (yet) intervened in this controversy, leaving 
the stage open for amateurs and polemists on both sides.
The muqawama debate examined here might also be conceived of as 
the closure of the colonial period in Mauritania, epitomized by France’s 
“peaceful expansion” and its proposed model of “development” (Sarr 
2016:26). In this regard, an effective return to local spheres of debate and 
influence, which largely coincides with the social model acknowledged in 
the western regions of the Sahara, is clearly noticeable (Bonte 1984:28). 
But if this is indeed the case, the Hassān/Zwāya partition is not the only 
subject in need of re-evaluation; we must also reconsider the contemporary 
prominence, and intricate role, attached to other actors with stigmatized 
genealogies, who have also begun to make their voices heard in the coun-
try’s social landscape.
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Notes
 1.  On the “incremental” colonial conquest of the Senegalo-Mauritanian zone, see 
Robinson (2001:60–74).
 2.  Currently four private TV channels (Chinguit, Sahel, Al-Mourabitoun, 
Al-Wataniya) and three private radio stations (Nouakchott Al-Hurra, Kobenni, 
and Al-Tanwîr) operate in Mauritania.
 3.  Mauritania came in second on the “Freedom of Press Ranking in the Arab 
World / 2013” (https://rsf.org/fr/classement-mondial-2013). All translations 
from the French and Arabic were made by Elemine Ould Mohamed Baba 
except when stated otherwise.
 4.  On the transformation of religious and historical narratives through the use of 
media technologies in Islamic Africa, see Hackett and Soares (2015).
 5.  Algeria: McDougall (2017), Stora (2003); Morocco: Ksikes and Grotti (2010); Mali 
and Senegal: Dramé (2011); Spain: Pigenet et al. (2005); Italy: Oppizzi (2017).
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 6.  France is probably the country where this has been more clearly felt. Paris has 
enacted memorial legislation on the Jewish (1990) and the Armenian (2001) 
genocides, on slavery (2001), and on the positive role of French colonization 
(2005) (Manceron 2009; Rémond 2014). The existence of memorial legisla-
tion, initiated by the state, has led historians to question its validity.
 7.  The case of the harkis (Algerian military personnel fighting alongside the col-
onizer during the country’s war of independence) in France could easily be 
compared with the Mauritanian resistance debate. They are perceived by some 
as heroes who should be honored, while for others they are brigands whose 
actions must be silenced (Gensburger 2002).
 8.  “Faut-il déboulonner la statue du général Faidherbe?,” in La Voix du Nord 
(http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/355672/article/2018-04-10/faut-il-deboulonner-
la-statue-du-general-faidherbe).
 9.  The most significant of the Hassān victories was the one that ended Shurbub-
bîh’s war in 1677. That war, initiated around 1671, opposed groups of Berber 
ancestry (led by the Tashumsha tribal confederation) to the Hassān. This 
war, whose main theater was the Al-Gibla region of southwestern Mauritania, 
resulted in the disarmament of those who then became known as Zwāya, and 
who would henceforth devote themselves to commerce, education, scholar-
ship, and religion. With time, the defeated party started to enjoy great moral 
authority and a formidable aura of mysticism. The excessive, if not overwhelm-
ing, presence of Zwāya traditions in the writing of the region’s history should 
be highlighted. With the notable exception of the al-haswa al-baysaniya, whose 
author, Salih b Abdel Wahhab, is Hassān, all the country’s historical accounts 
have been written by Zwāya scholars (see Ould Cheikh 1999:7–49; Warscheid 
2018). Al-Yadali (d. 1753) is usually identified as the author who established 
the Zwāya version of Bidhan history, as opposed to the Hassān politico-military 
hegemonic order (see Ould Babbah 1990). His famous Shiam al-Zwaya was 
adopted by the French colonial school, consolidating a clear partition between 
the “honest” Zwāya and the “irascible” Hassān.
 10.  In its more extensive reading this geography should comprise an area between 
Gouleimim, in southern Morocco, and the center of present-day Mauritania. 
Moorish country comprises four large parts: south (Al-Gibla), east (Charg), 
west, and north (Sahil). These areas are often preceded by the term Ahil 
(“people of”), when referring to its inhabitants.
 11.  Born in Corsica in 1866, Xavier Coppolani grew up in Algeria, where he stud-
ied Arabic and Islam. He was the author, with Octave Depoint, of a book on 
religious brotherhoods (1897, Les Confréries Religieuses Musulmanes) and visited 
eastern Mauritania in 1897. His experience as an administrator in Algeria and 
his knowledge of Moorish society led him to develop a policy that avoided 
confrontation by reconciling the spiritual leaders and playing on the quarrels 
between the warrior-status groups. It was through this strategy of “peaceful 
expansion” that he embarked on the draft constitution of “Western Maurita-
nia” in 1899 (Désiré-Vuillemin et al. 1962; see also Harrison 1988:207, footnote 
33; Bonte 1984:11–12). Cheikh Sidiya Baba (1860–1924) was an Islamic scholar 
and Cheikh of the Qadiriya brotherhood. He played a pivotal role during colo-
nization by establishing himself as the privileged interlocutor of the French, who 
benefited from his moral cover. His fame has also been fostered by legendary acts 
of generosity and tireless missions of good offices that solved countless conflicts 
throughout the entire Moorish land (Norris 1972:190–217; Stewart 1973).
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 12.  Sharif Sidi Ould Moulay Zein descends from an Adrarian Chorfa family and was a 
member of the Ghoudhf’s tariqa. It is said that, in a dream, he anticipated killing 
the leader of the kuffar (“infidels”). In the raid that led to the killing of Coppolani, 
he was accompanied by his tlāmīd (“disciples”) from the Idaichilli qabīla (“tribe”).
 13.  Ma al-‘Ainin—the son of Mohamed Fadel, the founder of Fadiliya 
brotherhood—was born c. 1830 and left his homeland in eastern Mauritania 
to settle in the north, where he acquired an aura of holiness. In 1899 he 
founded the city of Smara in the Seguiet al-Hamra, further to the north. He 
was the main instigator of opposition to French colonization. Considered to 
be a spiritual leader, he used messages, emissaries, and fatwas in his tireless 
efforts to stop what he called “the conquest of a land of Islam by Christians.” 
Upon the death of Coppolani, a delegation comprising various western Saharan 
tribes asked him to request military and political support from the Moroccan 
sultan. The support he obtained marked the starting point of the great resistance 
offensive that began after Coppolani’s death.
 14.  Fatwa: legal Islamic advice produced by Muslim scholars (‘ulamā). Although we 
no longer have this particular document, we have at least two fatwas by Ould 
Zeidan and by Cheikh Saad Bouh responding to Ma al-‘Ainin’s theological argu-
ments (Collection of Manuscripts of the Mauritanian Institute of Scientific Research in 
Nouakchott). It should be noted that texts not favorable to the colonizers were 
often destroyed. This is likely to be the case with Cheikh Ma al-‘Ainin’s fatwas, 
whose only proof of existence are the—available—responses to them.
 15.  “Télégraphie Sans Fil.” The impact of radio transmissions was significant, and 
it largely eliminated the surprise effect of Moorish raids.
 16.  The Cheikhs affiliated with the brotherhoods established in southwestern 
Mauritania did, in fact, issue numerous fatwas in favor of the colonial pres-
ence (Ould Mohamed Baba 1984:40–48).
 17.  This retired officer of the National Guard has often taken courageous posi-
tions, demanding, for example, an improvement in the conditions in which 
Pulaar politicians were held in a prison in eastern Mauritania. He has also 
called for the victims of the Western Saharan War (1975–1979) to be rehabil-
itated, and more recently opposed the promotion of officers he considered 
unworthy of being promoted (Ould Beibacar 2016).
 18.  Published in the Mauritanian newspaper Horizons, issue number 5126, p. 3, 
November 2009.
 19.  From the Arabic word ghazwa, meaning “raid,” or “group of warriors organized 
to conduct a raid.” Some members of this group came from the neighboring 
territory of Rio de Oro, which was under Spanish occupation, although its 
inhabitants are also Bidhan. On the Spanish presence in this region during this 
period, see Sanchez (1932) and Bullón Díaz (1945).
 20.  Louis Frèrejean was present in Tidjikja when Coppolani was murdered and, 
being the oldest of the captains, replaced him (Frèrejean 1995).
 21.  This debate also had a massive impact in social media, with hundreds of com-
mentaries debating this text, notably on Facebook.
 22.  These articles were published by Ahmed Ould Haroun Ould Cheikh Sidiya on 
Mauritanian news sites between November 2014 and July 2015. For a summary, 
see http://www.arayalmostenir.com/node/487.
 23.  November is “independence month” in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 
and the occasion for its commemoration and the periodic resurgence of patri-
otic discourses. Mauritania’s private TV channels have found a rich subject and 
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a source of important funding in this controversy. And some, like Chinguit TV, 
effectively place no limits on the kind of intervention in these debates.
 24.  Cheikh Sidiya Ould Mokhtar al-Hayba (1777–1868), one of the greatest Mau-
ritanian scholars and Sufi leaders, organized the Tindawja conference in 1856 
with the purpose of reconciling the four Mauritanian emirates and preparing a 
common offensive against French presence.
 25.  For a listing of the fatwas that justify the use of jihad (or hijra) against French 
colonization, see Ould Mohamed Baba (1984:40–48). For a regional historic 
overview, see Curtin (1971).
 26.  Notably associated with Mohammed Habib Allah, Mohamed Khadir, Mohamed 
al-Aghib (all three from the Mayāba family), and Ould Habott.
 27.  Published in the Mauritanian newspaper, Horizons, issue number 5126, p. 3, 
November 2009.
 28.  Ould Cheikh has stated that references to Mauritania’s colonial period were 
erased during Ould Daddah’s regime (1960–1978). According to this author, 
the first synopsis of an official history of Mauritania (a manual entitled History 
of Mauritania, which remained the reference for Mauritanian teachers until 
the early 1980s) does not go beyond the seventeenth century, thus removing 
the entire modern and contemporary periods. This chronological option led 
Ould Cheikh to think that the authors of the book (three Mauritanians and 
one French writer) opted to explore only the consensual periods in the coun-
try’s history, such as the Empire of Ghana, or the Almoravid episode (Ould 
Cheikh 1999:41). For his part, H. Al-Muritaniyi (the pseudonym of Mohamed 
Ould Cheikh, a Mauritanian politician from the left wing of the Mauritanian 
government) had already underlined, in a pamphlet published in 1975, the 
neocolonial character of the early Mauritanian governments. He declared their 
action to be the direct and docile heir of colonial administrative policies and 
interests (Al-Muritaniyi 1975). In fact, school textbooks only started to mention 
the muqawama in the early 1980s, after the fall of Ould Daddah (interview with 
Abdoulaye Diakhité, Nouakchott, September 28, 2018).
 29.  Translation of the speech available on the official website of the government 
press agency (AMI): http://www.ami.mr/Depeche-46196.html.
 30.  The short interlude of Ould Cheikh Abdellahi’s presidency (April 2007-August 
2008) could be considered “the second civil regime” in Mauritania. Historians 
are well aware that the construction of memory also involves the use of rituals, 
ceremonies, songs, flags, and monuments (Young 1994, 1993).
 31.  The new Mauritanian anthem was written in response to a commission from 
the Ministry of Culture. This new anthem clearly appeals to nationalist fervor, 
in contrast to Cheikh Sidiya Baba’s wording of the previous anthem, which 
exclusively focused on the country’s pious nature.
 32.  Constitutional Referendum Law No. 2017-021 / PR revising Article 8 of the 
Constitution of July 20, 1991 published in the Official Journal of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Mauritania, No. 1393 Bis, August 2017.
 33.  Todorov (1995) famously declared that the appropriation of history by legis-
lators constituted nothing less than “memory abuse,” and in 2005 the petition 
“Freedom for History” called for the repeal of all memorial laws.
